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On Sunday, June 13, 2010 representatives from China and 
Taiwan1 held a third round of talks in Beijing on an Economic 
Cooperation  Framework  Agreement  (ECFA)  that  would 
liberalize important aspects of cross-Strait economic relations. 
Details of what was agreed and what remains under negotia-
tion are still trickling out, and in any case the nature of this 
framework is that various elements will be agreed upon on an 
ongoing basis rather than at once. But it is clear from available 
details that ECFA will be an ambitious accord that fundamen-
tally changes the game between Taiwan and China and hence 
1. We use the terms China and Taiwan in the vernacular, without prejudice to 
preferences in either capital about the ideal nomenclature for the polities. 
affects the regional economy and even the transpacific tempo 
for the United States.
While the exact terms and sequencing of ECFA remain 
to be seen, we have prepared an analysis of its implications 
using the general parameters of the undertaking as described 
to us by senior officials in Beijing and Taipei.2 In the study, we 
explore the existing abnormalities in the cross-Strait economic 
relationship, the long-term costs of those abnormalities for 
both sides, the motivations in moving to a new framework, 
and the projected economic implications of something like 
ECFA. We also examine the security concerns arising from 
an even deeper interdependence and compare those with the 
concerns arising from business as usual.
Motivations
At first glance, some think the status quo has been favorable 
to Taiwan. China mostly extends World Trade Organization 
(WTO)–standard  most-favored  nation  status  to  Taiwan—
meaning  trade  terms  equivalent  to  those  all  other  WTO 
members receive—while Taiwan imposes unilateral barriers to 
imports, investment, and visitors from China. Economically 
speaking,  however,  the  more  “protected”  party—Taiwan—
saddles its household consumers and enterprise manufactur-
ers with more expensive inputs where China would be most 
competitive, deprives the economy of productive investment, 
and cuts off skilled labor mobility that could benefit Taiwan. 
Moreover, the ambiguity of Taipei’s stance and uncertainty 
about competitiveness likely scare away domestic investment 
and other Asian and Western investors. 
Not only is this status quo not optimal for Taiwan but also 
with the advent of deeper economic integration accords in the 
region—such as the free trade agreement between the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations and China (ASEAN+China), 
which entered into force on January 1, 2010—Taiwan’s posi-
tion in the world’s most important new market is eroding, as 
its peer competitors agree on preferential trade and investment 
terms with Beijing that go beyond the WTO standard. There-
fore, the baseline situation that motivates Taiwan is not merely 
2. Daniel Rosen and Zhi Wang, The Implications of China-Taiwan Economic 
Liberalization (Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
forthcoming 2010). 
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business as usual but rather diminishing marginal benefit from 
regional trends.
For its part, China is frank in stating that it supports 
an ECFA undertaking because it believes this will maximize 
the  prospect  for  eventual  political  integration  across  the 
Taiwan Strait. But officials in Beijing argue that this belief is 
rooted not in the idea that ECFA would enhance their abil-
ity to coerce Taiwan but in the view that it would maximize 
mutual prosperity and Taiwan’s perception of common inter-
est, thereby establishing the goodwill necessary to facilitate 
political rapprochement in the future. Our conjecture is that 
the security and political consequences of marginalization for 
Taiwan under the current, abnormal conditions are at least 
as  deleterious  to  the  island’s  core  interests  as  normalizing 
economic relations would be.
Projections
To  assess  the  economic  impact  of  ECFA,  we  employ  an 
economic model similar to the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) platform, which can capture the economic liberaliza-
tion already happening and likely to happen in Asia in the 
near future, in order to simulate the dynamic context around 
the choices confronting Taipei and Beijing. 
Our first important projection is that by implementing 
an ECFA along the lines of the ASEAN+China agreement, 
Taiwan would increase its 2020 GDP by about 4.5 percent, or 
$21 billion, from the current trend line. But we also conclude 
that the trend line will not stand still, and other agreements in 
the region will be negotiated (ASEAN+3), which will impose 
costs on Taiwan, if it does not do an ECFA, to the tune of 
almost –0.8 percent of GDP. So the net effect of ECFA for 
Taiwan would be some 5.3 percent improvement in GDP by 
2020. 
We can think of few (if any) other policy reforms available 
to Taipei that could deliver such gains. While some of these 
gains arise from Taiwan dismantling its non-WTO compliant 
import prohibitions on China, the gains also rely on China 
reducing tariffs on key Taiwan goods to free trade agreement 
levels. Other aspects of the relationship necessary to realize 
the benefits of tariff reductions—like normal government-to-
government regulatory communication—rely on negotiated, 
not just unilateral, outcomes.
This alone is an important result and is greater than in 
most other studies because (among other things) we recognize 
that the bulk of economic benefits from ECFA accrue only 
in the medium term, so we set the end year to 2020. We also 
argue that this is a conservative projection: Our model falls 
short  of  projecting  a  slew  of  economic  benefits,  especially 
service-sector gains and cross-border investment flows.
Since an insight of the study is that the regional economy 
around China and Taiwan is not standing still but is extraordi-
narily dynamic, we do not stop with this ECFA-only scenario. 
One of the most heated questions in Taiwan (though it is 
largely left out of formal discussions such as those that took 
place on June 13) is whether Taiwan could follow ECFA with 
similar  liberalization  agreements  with  other  economies—at 
least the ones that already have free trade agreements with 
China itself, like ASEAN—without interference from China. 
This is a delicate political consideration from Beijing’s perspec-
tive, though we would argue that it is time for China to set 
aside these anxieties. 
While we can’t model the correct way forward on the 
politics of this question, we did model the projected benefits 
for Taiwan from being able to do so. If after ECFA Taiwan 
joined the ASEAN+China regime, for instance, its 2020 GDP 
would rise 4.9 percent instead of 4.5 percent, or roughly 5.7 
percent  if  measured  from  the  reduced  GDP  outcome  that 
eventuates should Taiwan eschew cross-Strait normalization. 
This additional benefit is positive, clearly, but the more impor-
tant point is that it is very modest compared with the gains 
from ECFA itself. The reason is simple: Taiwan already has 
normal trade relations with the rest of Asia; it is with China 
that it maintains welfare-diminishing barriers, and so it is with 
China that liberalization would bring the greatest gains. The 
corollary insight—which is just as important—is that once 
ECFA is achieved, the bulk of gains available to Taiwan from 
regional trade liberalization would be locked in regardless of 
whether it resolves the impediments to doing free trade agree-
ments with other economies. This is not to say those other 
arrangements would not benefit Taiwan, they would; but the 
cross-Strait gains are disproportionately large given the sheer 
magnitude of China’s economic growth and the unique abnor-
malities between Taiwan and China. 
Finally, our modeling offers insights for other economies 
from the ECFA and ECFA+ scenarios.3 For China, the net 
3. In our forthcoming book, our analysis goes well beyond this policy brief to 
examine sectoral effects, trade versus other welfare effects, and other dimen-
sions. 
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results of ECFA are positive, though far less so than for Taiwan 
in value terms and of course as a share of GDP. For other 
economies in the region, including those that have enjoyed 
an intermediary role in lieu of direct China-Taiwan economic 
links, the impact of ECFA is modest (in some cases positive); 
in no case do we foresee economic grounds for concern among 
the other players in the region. Even Hong Kong, which has 
been the main entrepôt between China and Taiwan, has little 
to be concerned about from China-Taiwan normalization. 
In  the  case  of  the  United  States,  our  model  shows  a 
very modest positive result from ECFA (though statistically 
marginal), but a more negative impact as the scenarios incor-
porating further Asian integration (ASEAN+3) unfold. Sever-
al insights arise from this component of our analysis. First, if 
the US objective is to maximize Taiwan’s economic prospects 
and hence its freedom of independent action, then ECFA is 
highly desirable, and Taiwan’s involvement in further Asian 
deepening is to be supported. Second, however, we should 
be mindful of what the models are telling us: US economic 
interests per se erode as Asia draws tighter together without 
US inclusion. That is an econometric reality. More signifi-
cant still is the geoeconomic, qualitative implication of even 
long-standing nemeses China and Taiwan drawing together 
in a free trade pact while the United States watches, unable 
to ratify already negotiated Asian trade agreements like the 
US-Korea free trade agreement. 
Policy conclusion
Our economic projections of the effects of a China-Taiwan 
economic  liberalization  agreement  point  to  the  significant 
benefits of cross-Strait economic reform, especially for Taiwan. 
Modeling the impacts on other economies helps illuminate the 
importance of US engagement in Asian economic integration. 
Washington and Taipei can add to the balance in geoeconomic 
momentum centered on China by reinvigorating their ongo-
ing Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) talks 
and by considering other opportunities for transpacific bridge 
building that includes the United States. In that context, the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the United States is 
pursuing with others in the region, may present an attrac-
tive test of Taiwan’s ability to engage in additional economic 
liberalization, once ECFA is agreed (and assuming TPP moves 
ahead in a meaningful way). 
Taiwan has more limited experience in negotiating serious 
trade liberalization than most other Asian economies, and in 
ECFA talks Beijing’s underlying political motives may cause 
it to restrain its trade negotiators from pushing for maximum 
benefits. Going beyond ECFA, if Taiwan wants to capitalize 
on the opportunity to build more economic links, it will need 
to catch up quickly in terms of the skills to negotiate and then 
ratify and implement at home its external commitments. That 
Taiwan should encounter some missteps in implementation 
given  its  relative  isolation  in  the  past  is  understandable; 
but if Taipei is to make use of any greater opportunity to 
conclude agreements externally in the future it will have to 
do  better.  Whether  the  challenge  is  executing  a  product-
specific  import  agreement,  implementing  ECFA  itself,  or 
convincing the populace that going through WTO dispute 
resolution procedures is a mark of maturity, not an indication 
of weakness, Taiwan’s leaders have political challenges at home 
that Beijing’s officials are not constrained by.4 This should be 
good news—an aspect of commonality with more advanced 
democracies, not a source of misgiving about Taiwan’s ability 
to deliver on its trade commitments. 
As with any preferential trade agreement, the ECFA now 
moving closer to conclusion between Beijing and Taipei will 
take time to complete and then to enact. Its ultimate worth 
will depend on the fidelity with which it is enforced and the 
competence with which the private sectors and bureaucracies 
on both sides facilitate the commerce that should be empow-
ered by it. While the details, including myriad sectoral and 
industrial codicils, remain to be seen, our modeling makes 
clear that the aggregate implications of ECFA are very impor-
tant  economically  and  thus  will  likely  have  an  impact  on 
the larger relationship between China and Taiwan, between 
those two and the region, and between that region and the 
United States. While modest in its global economic effects, we 
believe the geoeconomic implications are significant enough 
to  demand  strategic  attention  from  the  United  States  and 
underscore as well as anything the importance of securing US 
economic engagement of the first order in Asia.
4. We are mindful that China’s leadership, while not constrained by an elector-
ate, has its own limitations at home: the complexity of managing the world’s 
largest population, epic inequalities between rich and poor, a weak legal system 
for enforcing trade obligations, and developmental challenges that tempt local 
officials to circumvent national commitments, to name just a few. 
While modest in its global economic effects, 
we believe the geoeconomic implications 
are significant enough to demand strategic 
attention from the United States.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. This publication is part of the overall programs 
of the Institute, as endorsed by its Board of Directors, but does not necessarily reflect the views of individual 
members of the Board or the Advisory Committee.